Participants' Reports
Disarmament: A Chance for Revival in the War Against Terror?

Presented by Natasha Bajema
Monterey Institute of International Studies
Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the norms and principles established by multilateral regimes for non-proliferation and disarmament have experienced significant setbacks and faced many challenges. For example, these regimes, in the cases of North Korea, India and Pakistan, have failed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The lack of sincere progress towards the disarmament commitments made by nuclear-weapons States, military doctrines of first-use, and recent doctrines of pre-emption may jeopardize the continued renunciation of nuclear weapons by other non-nuclear-weapon States.

Other multilateral disarmament instruments are faced with problems as well. State parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) were unable to negotiate a protocol to provide for a verification mechanism. The chances for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) entering into force in the near future are bleak. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the only negotiations forum for disarmament treaties, has remained deadlocked for over seven years.

Arms control initiatives have also taken a hit. Deviating from the START process, the Treaty of Moscow fails to provide for dismantlement or verification, both of which would demonstrate to the world that the risks associated with these nuclear weapons no longer exist. In addition, U.S. Congress has moved to lift a 10 year ban on research related to low-yield nuclear weapons. The Russian Federation has hinted that it may also follow suit with the development of new nuclear weapons.

And so, it would appear that concept of disarmament is dead, traditional arms control – a thing of the past, and attempts to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through disarmament treaties – hopeless.


Are Multilateral Disarmament Regimes Still Relevant Today?

The goals of disarmament and non-proliferation became even more relevant after the terrorist attacks on September 11. The attacks of 9/11 demonstrated the willingness of terrorists to cause mass casualties and raised the bar for future attacks. This could mean that terrorists will be more inclined to use weapons of mass destruction in the future. The subsequent anthrax letter attacks seem to confirm this possibility. As a result, WMD terrorism has been widely touted throughout the news media as the foremost imminent threat in a post-9/11 world.

If this is indeed the case, then the events of September 11 should have provided significant impetus for strengthening the multilateral regimes on non-proliferation and disarmament. Yet so far, the political momentum to address the threat of terrorism has not led to any renewed efforts to strengthen these regimes. Instead, multilateral disarmament instruments remain hampered by the entrenched positions of states.

Although these regimes were not designed to address threats posed by non-state actors, they provide the only multilateral instruments and fora for dealing with threats related to WMD terrorism. However, many critics in the Bush administration, buttressed by a Republican Congress, have expressed doubt about the effectiveness of existing multilateral instruments in addressing new threats. These critics have referred to these instruments as relics of Cold War thinking and called for new approaches.

This attitude seems to be contagious even among proponents of disarmament. Just the other day during a panel discussion at the United Nations, I heard a long-time pro-disarmament expert speak about the role of multilateral treaties. To my surprise, he argued that we need to recognize the limits of multilateral instruments and take a more realistic approach. He continued by noting that treaties are inherently prisoner of the time in which they were negotiated. Considering the current state of affairs, it is tempting to agree with this assessment. But are we really witnessing the limits of multilateralism or rather a lack of political will to effectively use multilateral tools?


Can Multilateral Disarmament Regimes Effectively Address the Threat of WMD Terrorism?

I will focus the rest of my presentation on two multilateral treaties that are similar in format and serve as a basis for the chemical and biological regimes, namely the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

There are many legitimate reasons to question the effectiveness of multilateral disarmament treaties in addressing WMD terrorism.

  1. The most obvious shortcoming is that the treaties are state-based, meaning they are designed to regulate, monitor and verify the actions of states, not actions of non-state actors such as terrorists. In addition, terrorists do not consider themselves bound by international treaties or the taboos established by them.
  2. Because the treaties are focused on state proliferation of WMD, they are weapons-based rather than materials-based. The treaties prohibit activities involving weapons but permit peaceful activities. In reality the distinction between materials and equipment for offensive weapons or peaceful purposes is blurry.
    The CWC and the BWC only make specifications for weapons-based activities. The treaty texts do not contain detailed instructions on material-based measures such as physical protection or material control.
  3. The treaties are not universal. Some states of concern, considered the most likely candidates to provide terrorists with assistance, are not party to the treaties.
  4. The treaties are generally vague about the types of legislation and measures that are necessary for national implementation, which allows for a broad and varied interpretation by states parties.
  5. Many States parties have not fully implemented their obligations under the treaties. A treaty is only effective if it is consistently implemented at the national level.

Despite these shortcomings, multilateral treaties represent promising tools for addressing the threats posed by terrorists gaining access to materials of mass destruction for a number of reasons.

  1. The multilateral treaties are all-inclusive and promote cooperation among and integration of all states. Initiatives involving cooperation among like-minded states are often criticized as exclusive clubs. These initiatives do not include the states of most concern and tend to antagonize rather than promote cooperation with these states.
  2. The provisions of the treaties can extend beyond regulating state actions in their requirement for national implementation.
    For example, article IV of the BWC states that each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, equipment and means of delivery within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.
    This article does not only apply to the actions of the State itself, but also to any offensive biological activities on its territory or under its jurisdiction. Though not explicitly, the implementation of this article would involve preventing and prohibiting the offensive biological activities of non-state actors.
  3. The full and universal implementation of the treaties would entail wide-ranging measures addressing the threat of terrorists gaining access to materials.
    There are two key words in article IV of the BWC, which suggest the range of measures that would be necessary for national implementation: prohibit and prevent. What are the necessary measures to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition of biological materials and equipment for hostile purposes? Ideally, measures would entail the criminalization of such activities by developing legislation, strict penalties and the regular enforcement of these laws. What are the necessary measures to prevent the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition of biological materials and equipment for hostile purposes?
    These measures could include:
    • Regulations on international and domestic transfers
    • Physical protection
    • Material control and accounting
    • Safety procedures
    As each class of weapons has different technical aspects, there are well-established regimes for each type of weapons.
    The media and governments tend to lump the three types of weapons into one threat and speak about terrorists gaining access to materials or weapons of mass destruction. In reality, each type of weapon and its materials present different challenges and require specific measures.
  5. The extent of these treaties is not limited to the texts of the treaties.
    While the treaty text is the legally-binding document, the BWC is actively strengthened through review conferences. Agreements reached at Review Conferences, while not legally binding, are politically binding.
    In the case of the BWC, the Review Conferences have noted the importance of:
    • Providing physical protection of laboratories and facilities to prevent unauthorized access to and removal of pathogenic or toxic material
    • Regulating domestic and internatioanl transfers to ensure that individuals or subnational groups are effectively prevented from acquiring biological agents and toxins for hostile purposes
    • Preventing the use of biological and toxin weapons in terrorist or criminal activity
    Multilateral instruments can be flexible, involve new approaches, and adapt to current realities.
    Consider the new process for the BWC. The BWC Follow-up Process, established by the Fifth Review Conference in 2002, involves annual meetings of States Parties and experts to discuss key issues, many directly relevant to addressing the threat of biological terrorism. These discussions could lead to a strengthened BWC that would be better equipped to address the threat of biological terrorism and new security threats.

Why are these Instruments Not Being Used to Their Full Potential?

Multilateral disarmament treaties are not being used effectively for three main reasons.

  1. A crisis in leadership
    The US has long been a leader in promoting international cooperation on disarmament and nonproliferation. Since the Bush administration took office in 2000, it has set the global agenda unilaterally without much regard for establishing a multilateral consensus. The Bush administration calls for “effective multilateralism”. In reality, the Bush administration uses a strategy of “selective multilateralism” and has embraced international regimes mostly in rhetoric rather than in deed. The Bush administration has also indicated that it has no intention of improving the effectiveness of these regimes by strengthening them from within. Instead, the administration is determined to pursue US interests outside of these frameworks with other like-minded states. The lack of U.S. support for multilateral regimes has compromised progress on disarmament and non-proliferation and jeopardized the staying power of these regimes, which are dangerously close to becoming relics of the Cold War.
  2. A shift from nonproliferation and disarmament to counterproliferation
    There has been a notable shift from nonproliferation and disarmament to counterproliferation. On 30 October, John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Bolton stated that it is the long-term objective of the US “to create a web of counterproliferation partnerships.”
    There is certainly room for these types of initiatives. However, there is a danger in creating an imbalance between supply-side initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and demand-side instruments such as the multilateral disarmament treaties. The current emphasis on counterproliferation combined with the lack of action and leadership on the part of the US with regard to multilateral disarmament regimes may lead to increased demand for WMD. In this case, supply-side instruments will be forced to expand and become more and more costly in the long-term.
  3. Lack of political will to implement the treaties and strengthen them to meet current threats
    The multilateral treaties are not effective on their own. They are essentially broad international frameworks for addressing these global issues. To be effective, these regimes must be implemented fully through the development and enforcement of national legislation and measures. The non-proliferation and disarmament regimes are tools for addressing the threat of WMD, not actors. They are only as effective as their users allow them to be.

Are there Prospects for Revival?

I am hopeful for two reasons.
Despite its origins, the new process for the BWC holds promise for new approaches and new modes of operation within multilateral regimes. The process has already raised awareness on implementation issues and may even lead to improvements in national implementation.
I am also optimistic about a shift in the role of the EU on non-proliferation and disarmament issues. In the past years, the EU has become more engaged on these issues and mayb possibly be in a position to fill the leadership void left by the US. This role has become increasingly significant with the recent visit of the French, German and British foreign ministers to Iran and the EU’s new nonproliferation strategy introduced in June of this year.
In conclusion, I believe that the role of multilateral treaties and regimes is limited not due to the limits of multilateralism or weaknesses in these instruments, but rather due to the lack of political will to use multilateral instruments effectively and strengthen them to adapt to current realities.
  1. See Mohamed ElBaradei, “WMD & Global Security: Time for Reform,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 45, No. 1, June 2003, pp. 4-6.




  2. In his State of the Nation Address presented on 16 May, President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation made reference to the planned modernization of Russia’s nuclear deterrent and program of rearmament. Specifically, President Putin declared, “a serious component of reform of the armed forces will be the strengthening and modernization of the nuclear deterrent. Besides that, I can inform you that at present the work to create new types of Russian weapons, weapons of the new generation, including those regarded by specialists as strategic weapons is in the practical implementation stage. These weapons will ensure the defense capability of Russia and its allies in the long term.”
12/12/03