Participants' Reports
Transatlantic Strategies for Conflict Resolution”
Joseph Nezih Yackley
English translation of
“Politikkoordination im Nahen Osten:
Transatlantische Strategien zur Konfliktlösung?”
(appeared in December 2002 edition of Internationale Politik, p. 45-50.
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Berlin)
INTRODUCTION
American and European reactions to September 11th, 2001 illustrate well the paradox of today’s transatlantic relationship. Declarations by European citizens and leaders that “we are all Americans,” were quickly followed by NATO’s unprecedented step of invoking Article 5 of its charter, declaring the attacks on the United States as attacks on the entire alliance. Previous disagreements seemed petty and a sense of shared values and identity emerged. The transatlantic alliance hadn’t seemed this healthy, or relevant, since the end of the Cold War.
Within a few short months, however, the honeymoon was over. One particular disagreement, what to do with the Middle East, is too large to sweep under the rug. While both sides share a mutual desire for peace in the region, disagreement reigns over how that can be achieved. Common values, it seems, do not translate into common policies. As a result, the prospects for a cooperative strategy for preventing conflict in the Middle East are quite bleak. A closer look at what drives these differences provides valuable insight into how they can be overcome – paving the way to improved prospects for both the Middle East and the transatlantic relationship.
POLICY DIFFERENCES
Differences in Middle East policy are nothing new to the transatlantic partnership. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Turkish membership in the European Union, and sanctions against Iran are a few of the more prominent examples. The issue of the day, however, is Iraq and the spotlight it has thrown on the rift between the United States and Europe is particularly bright.
This comes as no surprise to many. After all, Iraq is about war and recent explanations about what is troubling the transatlantic relationship have focused on the “capability gap,” that great and widening divide between Europe and the United States’ ability to wage war. In his widely-discussed article “Power and Weakness,” Robert Kagan contends that European criticism of American willingness to use its military strength is in large part due to Europe’s relative military weakness. Because Europe is not capable of applying force with the same effectiveness as the United States, it is often disparaging of that force.
“Hard power” is a decisive factor in foreign policy. It is, however, neither the sole nor the principal determinant of foreign policy. After all, Europe’s relative military weakness flows in large part from its more fundamental choices about military spending, which like other policy decisions reflect prevailing ideologies and perceived interests. Efforts toward creating a joint strategy to promote conflict resolution in the Middle East must therefore be based on an understanding of how three factors -- capabilities, ideologies and interests -- shape policy on both sides of the Atlantic.
Opinions & Ideologies
European nations and the United States are democracies, and democracies tend to pursue policies that echo public opinion. Not surprisingly, polls indicate different opinions on those issues that most divide Europe and the United States, including beliefs about each other’s role in the world and the appropriateness of military force.
American interventionism is driven by a long-standing exceptionalist impulse based on the widespread belief that the United States stands for that which is good in this world. As early as 1804, President James Madison wrote that the United States serves as an example “against the corruption which prevails.” According to President Woodrow Wilson, the United States rested on a higher moral plane, requiring it to “remake the world in its own image.” Ronald Reagan’s reference to the Soviet Union as the “evil empire” and George W. Bush’s “axis of evil” extend this logic and divide the world in a struggle between good and evil, implying that what is good for America is good for the world. For Bush, this justifies the application of military force to disseminate American interests abroad.
Contrary to popular belief, pacifism is not the guiding principle of European foreign policy. Yes, World War II taught Europe how evil war can be. A more important lesson, however, was that war is often a necessary evil, especially when faced with an aggressor like Hitler’s Germany.
Recent elections in Germany illustrate these nuances well. In the midst of a competitive campaign for chancellor, Gerhard Schröder ruled out German participation in a U.S.-led attack on Iraq, reflecting the opinion of most Germans and helping his party win the election. A closer look, however, reveals it was, in fact, a surprising performance turned in by his coalition partners, the Greens, that handed Schröder and his Social Democrats victory. The Greens were thought to have alienated their pacifist roots after agreeing to earlier German involvement in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Yet the party received the highest vote totals in its history. The only party in Germany to have resisted sending German troops to Afghanistan, the Democratic Socialists, fell below the five percent barrier required for an official group in the national parliament.
Interests & Relations
Apart from distinct attitudes about the need for war and the means to peace, the United States and Europe also have differing interests in the Middle East. For the United States, the events of September 11th added terrorism to a sharply defined, rather short list of interests that includes retaining access to energy supplies and protecting its strategic position in the region. A strict realpolitik based on immediate interests, popular opinion and military strength has given rise to a foreign policy focused on “hard security” issues. The promotion of human rights, democracy and economic development runs a distant second.
European interests, meanwhile, are wider-ranging. Geographic proximity elevates the importance of “soft security” issues like economic instability, social unrest, refugee crises, drug trafficking, international crime and ecological degradation. The European Union is tied to the Middle East through public and private investment, international trade and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This broad perspective creates shades of gray in a picture President Bush would rather paint as black and white, as suggested in the choice he presented to the world during an address to Congress on September 20, 2001 -- “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”
TOWARD A TRANSATLANTIC MIDDLE EAST POLICY
Since differences in European and U.S. policies in the Middle East grow out of different military capabilities, public opinion and national interests, how can we expect the two sides to cooperate on a joint approach to conflict resolution? The principles that united the United States and Europe after the September 11 -- faith in democracy, the rule of law, political accountability and participation, civil society, international peace and stable economic growth -- also happen to be principles they would like to see guiding a more stable Middle East. The challenge lies in shaping policies that promote these common ideals, while accounting for each side’s unique interests, ideologies and capabilities.
Until now, the United States and Europe have shirked this challenge, accepting a counterproductive division of labor in the Middle East, where the United States focuses on security and Europe is responsible for economic and social issues. This arrangement has failed to promote Middle East peace primarily because it does not address the prevailing dynamic that has lead to conflict in the past.
While the problems of today’s Middle East are confounding in their complexity, they can be traced back to characteristics common to many parts of the region: the overbearing political role played by national militaries, the lack of stable economic development and the dominance of totalitarian, undemocratic regimes. All three factors are prevalent in states considered most threatening to regional peace. Once combined, these factors blur the lines between economics and politics. Effective reform requires a comprehensive effort that addresses each these factors while unbinding the reinforcing connections between them. Both Europe and the United States must change their ways if they are to affect real change in the Middle East.
In a region increasingly shaped by questions of security, European military incompetence has led to a diplomatic impotence, undermining its confidence and ability to assume the role in the Middle East to which it aspires. Europe’s deficient military capability raises doubts in the United States that it can be a reliable partner and can pull its own weight when necessary. It also undermines Europe’s ability to steer peace making in the Middle East in a direction where its more influential assets can play constructive roles. The European Union is currently placing its faith in its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) initiative, but this is unlikely by itself to create a robust military role for Europe in the Middle East. Committed to maintaining its unipolar dominance, the United States will not slow down its military development to let the European Union catch up, nor do Europeans support the vast increase in military spending needed to bridge the gap.
Europe’s strategy for securing greater influence in the Middle East must therefore be two-fold. An increase in military spending must be complemented with an intensified focus on redefining regional problems and their potential solutions in non-military terms. Having 15 different members may complicate foreign policy, but it provides the European Union considerable flexibility in pursuing policies within a bilateral context. Historical, cultural, economic and political relationships between Germany and Turkey, France and Algeria, and Morocco and Spain, for instance, create unique opportunities for cooperation. Private business relationships between European and Middle Eastern states can spur needed political and economic reform. Many Middle Eastern states are highly dependent on foreign investment, both in terms of economic and political rents, and are willing to adjust regulation to attract foreign capital flows. Investors’ insistence for non-violent conflict resolution, functioning courts, political transparency and limited bureaucracy could help induce real reform.
For its part, the United States must refocus its priorities on promoting peace through economic development, political reform and regional integration. Military assistance to states in the region should be made dependent on political and economic reform. Measures designed to diversify the economies of the region should be pursued, helping to minimize political instability due to price fluctuations in oil and natural gas markets. Initiatives could include investment incentives to support multinational business ventures, reduction in barriers to multilateral and regional trade and financial support for cross-border development projects with countries in the region. Export promotion priorities for non-military articles should be introduced. A portion of military assistance could be earmarked for “security assistance,” to export technologies designed to address potentially destabilizing environmental issues such as competition over water resources. This would require only a fraction of the military assistance the United States currently provides to the region and the dividends would accumulate in economic, political and security terms. They would expand America’s stake in the Middle East beyond oil and military concerns, secure more channels for steering developments toward peace, and encourage the United States to assume a more active role in promoting conflict resolution, rather than reacting to developments once they go awry.
CONCLUSION
Despite current differences, the United States and Europe remain each other’s best friends when it comes to the Middle East. The European Union will look to the United States for help in improving its military capabilities -- a necessary ingredient in addressing the immediate threats posed by terrorism. The United States, on the other hand, will have to rely on Europe’s unique relationship with Middle Eastern states to provide effective incentives for non-military forms of conflict resolution. In an effort to undermine the cycle of conflict, underdevelopment and authoritarian rule in the Middle East, Europe and the United States must learn to rely on each other’s complementary strengths in order to overcome their individual weaknesses.
When Europe and the United States coordinate their policies they become a tremendous force for good in this world. When their policies are at odds, their mixed signals undermine mutually held goals for the international community. Measures to promote a transatlantic strategy for resolving conflict in the Middle East must commence in earnest before the trend toward extremism, military conflict and political destabilization gains further momentum. A certain division of labor in Middle East policy is natural. The distinct opinions, structures and short-term interests that drive U.S. and European foreign policy are influential factors that will not change immediately. The division of labor is also beneficial in a short-term sense: The European Union and the United States do what they do best. Over the long-term, however, these differences must be minimized lest they lead to increasing European irrelevance in a world ever more defined by American unilateralism. The health of the transatlantic relationship and of the Middle East may well depend on it.
Gaillard, Hunt, ed. The Writings of James Madison, Vol. VII. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1901.
Kagan, Robert. „Power and Weakness.“ In Foreign Policy, June/July 2002.
Kissinger, Henry. Does America Need a Foreign Policy? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 243.
Yackley, Joseph. “U.S. Security Assistance to Israel.” Foreign Policy In Focus. Volume 6, Number 23. Silver City, NM: Interhemispheric Resource Center, June 2001.
Zogby, James. “The U.S. and the World.” 7 January 2002. http://www.mediamonitors.net
“Continuing Storm: The U.S. Role in the Middle East.” Foreign Policy In Focus. Silver City, NM: Interhemispheric Resource Center. (http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/papers/mideast/democracy.html)